The voluminous study of Russian political thought recently published by Gary Hamburg covers a vast chronology from the 16th to the early 19th centuries. Hamburg, who currently holds the position of Otho M. Behr Professor of the History of Ideas at Claremont McKenna College in the USA, is well known among students of political ideas, for he published Boris Chicherin & Early Russian Liberalism in 1992 and edited the large collective volume A History of Russian Philosophy, 1830-1930: Faith, Reason and  the Defense of Human Dignity in 2010. The book under review apparently marks the expansion of Hamburg's research interests into an earlier period of Russian history, while the title, which repeats the words "faith" and "reason," indicates the continuity of the research program (as Hamburg says, he plans to take the same theme forward with a new volume entitled Russia's Road toward Emancipation: Politics, Faith and Community, each of these thinkers regarded himself primarily as a Christian patriot devoted to the advancement of Russian interests through learning, rather than as a cosmopolitan devoted to the advancement of modern civilization through the disinterested practice of science.
Insisting that Russian political thought adhered to the religious concept of Enlightenment rather than replacing it with secular values, Hamburg emphasizes:
It is important to reject the notion that Peter's reforms succeeded in secularizing Russia, and the related notion that Feofan "secularized Russian thought." That binary is too simple. In the Petrine era, the tensions between Church and state were not resolved by legislative acts, but were thoroughly internalized in the psyches of the country's most prominent, eloquent, and farseeing clergymen (p. 263).
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The lengthy third part, entitled "Straining toward Light, 1762-1801," presents an analy sis of a dozen leading Russian authors: Catherine II, Metropolitan Arsenii (Ma tseevich), Metropolitan Platon (Levshin), Nikita Panin, Denis Fonvizin, Gavriil Derzhavin, Ivan Tretʹiakov, Semen Desnitskii, Nikolai Novikov, Aleksandr Radishchev, Mikhail Shcherbatov and, fi nally, Nikolai Karamzin. Hamburg's conclusion is the following:
Russian thinking about politics through the end of the eighteenth century was a branch of applied Christian ethics or was heavily infl uenced by Christian ethics. It is therefore a basic error to interpret Russian political thinking before the nineteenth century as an exclusively secular pursuit (p. 30).
In each chapter, Hamburg proceeds with a methodical analysis of the works of each par ticular author. The problem, which is particularly important for a Russian reader, is that Hamburg includes long biographical discussions in his essays about the diff erent authors, alongside abridged retellings of their writings. Imagine a study of Hobbes' poli ti cal ideas that always starts from a description of his biography! Of course, this pro b lem is typical for most works on Russian political thought published in English, and for a clear reason: it is obvious that Tatishchev is far less familiar to the English reader than Hobbes. But at times it makes the narration rather monotonous, in contrast with the author's otherwise lively manner.
There are some small inconsistencies in the text. For example, Hamburg says that Feofan "cited Grotius's book The Law of Peace and War" (p. 249 Shcherbatov'" (p. 625) . But the phrase was at that time an offi cial appeal to the em press, so Shcherbatov was just following etiquette, without any specifi c purpose of hu mi lia ting himself.
1
In discussing Russian writers' adherence to the Orthodox Church, Ham burg notes that "Kheraskov, in spite of his adherence to Deism and mystical Freema sonry, did not campaign against the Orthodox Church, against 'religious fanaticism,' or against the autocracy"; while this is true in the fi rst and third cases, Kheraskov did attack religious fanaticism harshly in his political novel Numa Pompilius, or the Flourishing Rome (1768).
Undoubtedly, Hamburg draws several interesting conclusions, and his study provides some important insights. The very emphasis on the religious patterns of Russian political thought is of great value. Hamburg's characterizations of some historical fi gu res are insightful and deep on many occasions. The book, which covers a great chro no logical span, off ers a systematic view of the history of early modern Russian political thought.
However, there are three major problems which stalk Hamburg's work throughout. First, Hamburg relies on only a limited number of Russian authors. For instance, he igno res such productive thinkers as Vasilii Trediakovskii, Friedrich Strube de Piermont, 1 Hamburg makes the same mistake when noting: "About Anna's humble subjects, Feofan spoke honestly at last. He described them as 'we, your slaves'" (p. 262). And again, when speaking of Desnitskii, who "did not hesitate to use Muscovite language in describing his own status as a 'servant' or 'slave' of the crown" (p. 561).
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and Vladimir Zolotnitskii, the author of Russia's fi rst systematic treatise on natural law. The reason seems to be obvious: these authors were marginal in the historiographical tradition of the mid-20th century. Ivan Tretʹiakov and Semen Desnitskii, secondary authors of the Catherinian age, were of great importance for Soviet historians since they presented a progressive Smithian political economy; therefore, their works were re pub lished and read again and again. In contrast, the theory of natural law was of less in terest to Marxists, and therefore Zolotnitskii or Strube were not republished or stu died. Another example is the number of religious writers and preachers, such as Si mon (Todorskii), Silvestr (Kuliabka), Amvrosii (Iushkevich), Gavriil (Popov), and Iri nei (Klementievskii), to name but a few, who produced lots of "political theology" through out the 18th century (the same opinion is expressed by Gary Marker, who wrote a generally favorable review for The Russian Review [M 2017] ). These authors, who knew several languages (including Latin and Greek), were sensible to Western infl uen ces [K 2015] .
Taking this into account, it is rather surprising that the book starts with a reference to Quentin Skinner's methods as a source of inspiration. The book reproduces the very position Skinner was so critical of-namely, the reduction of the history of political thought to a textbook with a focus on a handful of "doctrines" [S 2002: 59] .
Second, Hamburg's analysis rests on the contradistinction of Muscovite tradition and Western infl uence. Both are understood as monolithic intellectual structures. This explanatory model is dangerous, for it tempts the researcher to substitute mere clas si fication in binary terms fortextual analysis. It is no surprise that Hamburg at times starts to speak in a disturbingly pejorative way: of the members of the Legislative Commission, he says, "Desnitskii's learned references to Roman law, his oblique criticism of autocracy and of serfdom, his talk about commercial republics, his comments on Smith's The Theo ry of Moral Sentiments, must have sounded like the twittering of birds" (p. 556). The existence of Russian tradition turns out to be a consequence of Russia's despotic po litical system: "The tragedy was that, even under Catherine's relatively benign rule, Rus sia did not entirely escape the sixteenth-century pattern of burying its intellectual rich ness under a superfi cial conformity" (p. 676). And since Russia's historical tradition is by essence religious and despotic, European innovations could appear only in confl ict with that tradition. It's a zero-sum game! Such an understanding of Westernization may have led to curious methodological as sumptions. For instance, when Hamburg speaks of the crisis of 1730, he uses the contra distinction of Western Enlightenment and Russian tradition in a manner reminiscent of Georgii Storm's Hidden Radishchev, a Soviet classic on the use of Aesopian language:
In the conditions of the absolutist state in which he lived, Golitsyn had to hide his knowledge from other members of the elite, to dissimulate his disagreements over the direction of his country, to pretend that he was a loyal subject of a crown he could not completely respect. When he fi nally spoke to the Supreme Privy Council in 1730, he did so forcefully, but without laying out the full justifi cation for his program, and even without spelling out the entire program at one sitting of the council. He then let others formulate the basic components of a plan he had long contemplated, thus making them jointly responsible for its composition (p. 301).
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In other words, it is not necessary to study whether Golitsyn actually had a plan, since the researcher can always reconstruct it by simply referring to an explanatory model based on the opposition between Enlightenment and tradition. And if Golitsyn's actions were supposedly directed against tradition, then-by the logic of a zero-sum gamethese actions inevitably had to be inspired by Enlightenment principles, even though Golitsyn avoided "spelling out the entire program." These assumptions, which are scattered ac ross the book, are all derived from the same model of interpretation, regardless of whe ther Hamburg is calling Semen Desnitskii's Senate design "a broadly representative le gis la ture" or insisting that Nikita Panin championed religious toleration.
It is probable that the opposition of secularism to religion worked fi ne at the beginning of the 20th century. Nowadays, however, it can hardly serve as a reliable method of study. Turning away from the Skinnerian study of vocabularies and manners of speech to embrace the history of monolithic doctrines undermines the validity of one of Ham burg's most important and valuable ideas, namely, the emphasis on the importance of the concept of virtue in Russian political culture. Since the binary explanatory system re quires him to classify each intellectual phenomenon as either Western or traditional, Ham burg considers virtue to be solely in the domain of traditional, moralistic, and religious culture. The very concepts remain unproblematic: summarizing the de ve lopment of Russian political thought by the end of the 17th century, Hamburg notes:
The Muscovite legacy ultimately inheres in the complexity of Orthodox thinking about politics: from the simple assumption that good Christians must pursue virtue and attempt to build just societies, there followed profound disagreements over how to do so (p. 217).
In other words, Hamburg sees the whole discourse on virtues as something simple, while in fact there was no single concept of virtue in 18th-century Russia (and, probably, even before the 18th century). Perhaps an analysis of church sermons and ethical manuals might add something to this fi eld, as well as an inquiry into 18th-century legislation re garding the nobility's privileges (based on a specifi c concept of noble virtue). Unfor tunately, the black-and-white explanatory model and narrow scope of historical sources prevents Hamburg's study from examining the conceptual diff erences among the defi nitions of virtue in 18th-century Russian public thought.
At times, this explanatory model makes the analysis rather imprecise. Let's take, for example, the chapter on Shcherbatov's understanding of virtue in the Journey to the Land of Ophir:
The Ophirians had slowly realized that, in olden times, they had fl attered their leaders, had pretended that their leaders' paper plans for model cities were feasible, and had succumbed to a general corruption of morals. The Ophirians now recognized that their leaders should be respected rather than fl attered, and that there is no point in pretending that paper plans are necessarily feasible. They had become realists with respect to city planning and all other governmental projects. The Ophirians had also recovered their moral sense [. . .] . They now found disorderly lives shameful, and they claimed to pursue virtue in all things (p. 635).
This lengthy quotation shows the negative eff ects of treating virtue as a simple, univocal moralist formula: Hamburg fails to grasp the social mechanics of virtue that
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Shcherbatov was describing in detail in his utopia. The notion of "paper cities" was used by Shcherbatov as a detail to demonstrate his criticism of Catherine's urban policies (the reconstruction of Tver, to be exact): by no means can it be read as his explanation for the emergence of virtue. Hamburg omits Shcherbatov's idea of restricting luxury and commerce to create a social environment suitable for moral revival. In Hamburg's analysis, the virtue of the Ophirians looks like a simple refusal to fl atter monarchs and to live shamefully; but, in fact, Shcherbatov saw quite clearly that virtue is grounded not only in the personal choice of whether to live shamefully or not, but also in social conditions, thus echoing the European tradition from Machiavelli to Montesquieu.
Shcherbatov, according to Hamburg, wanted to construct a "crazy hybrid" of the "best features of Muscovy" and the "best elements of European modernity"; how ever, "few Russians shared his appreciation for Muscovy, and fewer still his austere commit ment to the virtuous life." This contradicts Hamburg's own idea that virtue was the key element in the understanding of politics in Russia. Moreover, Shcherbatov's views were rather common in 18th-century Russia, and the features which he attributed to ima ginary Ophir and historical Muscovy were partially drawn from Western political, ethi cal, and historical literature, usually following the pattern of Ancient Rome. Yet Ham burg says nothing of these Roman patterns, instead explaining Shcherbatov's ideas through his biography:
He was a legatee of Muscovite family values caught in the dynamic but corrupt world of Catherine II, a Russian traditionalist and yet simultaneously a European cosmopolitan [. . .] In the future, Catherine made use of Shcherbatov's talents as historian, but she never trusted him with the high offi ce that might otherwise have been proff ered to a person of his background and attainments.
But Shcherbatov was born in 1733, a long time after the Petrine reforms had been launched; what specifi c kind of "Muscovite legacy" was he supposed to have received? Equal ly, Shcherbatov's career was far from unsuccessful: he was the head of the Collegium for State Income from 1778 to 1784, and-during his time in the offi ce-par tici pated actively in the discussion about laws on luxury, along with the most powerful offi cials of his time, General Procurator Aleksandr Viazemskii and the head of the Colle gium for Commerce, Ernst Munnich; Shcherbatov's ideas on luxury here were similar to the views he put on paper in his unpublished works.
Yet another example of the defi ciency of the binary explanatory model is the chapter on the Old Believers. Hamburg investigates whether Avvakum legitimized ac tive re sistance ("armed rebellion") to the crown, concluding that Avvakum's ideas on re sistance were rather "murky" (p. 180). But Hamburg says nothing about the Old Be lie vers' readi ness to resist by killing themselves; apparently, such a concept does not fi t the book's explanatory model. Also, speaking of Western infl uence on Russia, which "should not be under estima ted," Hamburg shapes this infl uence to conform with the explanatory model. The Wes tern contribution he talks about includes Montesquieu, Rousseau, Beccaria and the German cameralists, Smith, and so on. He fails to recognize, though, that Roberto Bellar mine, the Spanish anti-Machiavellists, and St. Augustine were also Western authors, and that in the world of printed texts and manuscript translations, they were much more Konstantin D. Bugrov popular than, say, Smith. In other words, the realm of ethics in Westernized Russia was also dominated by European authors; but to recognize this would at the same time disrupt an explanatory model based on the clear opposition between Russia and the West, ethics and politics. And Hamburg is aware of this; for instance, he productively discusses the infl uence of Justus Lipsius on Artemii Volynskii and Vasilii Tatishchev, but assigns Lipsius two roles: in one case, Lipsius appears as a source of inspiration for circumscribing royal power with the expertise of wise advisors (thus being a mani festation of European Enlightenment replacing Russia's essential culture of obedience and auto cracy), while in the other case, Lipsius is characterized merely as an "ardent Ca tholic" whose infl uence was dissolved within Russia's own religious tradition. As a result, Ham burg remains silent about Lipsius when discussing European infl uence in general; an "ardent Catholic" is not the kind of European Enlightenment thinker about whom the binary explanation speaks.
In addition, the use of "Western Enlightenment" and "Russian tradition" as labels always leads to the risk of confusion. Thus, Hamburg marks Catherine's ideas on liberty, formulated in her Instruction, as controversial: he considers the arguments of point 38 to be part of a "positive liberty" tradition, and the concepts from points 41 and 42 to be a borrowing from Montesquieu as a "rudimentary sketch" of "negative liberty." But, in fact, Catherine was following Montesquieu in defi ning liberty in both cases, and so her defi nition of liberty was generally leaning toward "negative liberty," provoking angry comments from Aleksandr Sumarokov. Sumarokov noted that honest persons knew the truth in their hearts and therefore "laws are prescribed for those who fi ght the truth [boriushchim istinu]" [S 2006: 135] , while Catherine and Montesquieu insisted that liberty is "the right to do whatever the laws do not prohibit."
These confusions might have been avoided had Hamburg relied more on the existing body of historical studies. But Hamburg's book almost totally omits the recent historiography, which is the third and probably most serious problem of this volume. The most recent work on Shcherbatov's thought which Hamburg mentions is Ivan Fedo sov's book [F 1967] . The most recent work on Panin's political ideas is David Ran sel's solid work [R 1975] , though Hamburg also quotes Oleg Omelchenko's mar velous study of 2001 on the Commission of the Noble Liberty; yet he remains silent with respect to recent works on Panin [P 2000; P 2010] . Speaking of to leration and faith in 18th-century Russia, Hamburg never quotes any book on toleration issues, even the fundamental work by A R [2006] ; it seems like Ham burg's equation of pre-modern society with the realm of fanatical adherence to the Church prevents him from analyzing the complexity of the toleration policies developed in Catherinian Russia. The same could be said in relation to the earlier periods studied by Hamburg. These examples could be multiplied. This historiographical isolation at times really surprises the reader: investigating whether Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii was really proposing a "Bill of Rights" to his subjects, Hamburg polemicizes with. . . Sergei Solovʹev. In a rather loose outline of Avvakum's political ideas, he argues with Sergei Ber diaev and Konstantin Leontʹev.
There is also one omission that we would like to stress specifi cally. Hamburg refers to Boris Uspenskĳ 's Tsar and Patriarch [U 1998 ] twice in the opening chapters when talking of medieval political thought, but he never refers to Boris Uspenskĳ 's and Viktor Zhivov's fundamental study of early modern Russian political culture, "Tsar Москва, 1994, 110-218. 
